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On Friday night, March 15, 2013, European leaders trespassed 
on consecrated ground.  They insisted that Cyprus impose losses -- 
euphemistically dubbed a “solidarity levy” -- on insured depositors with 
Cypriot banks as a condition to receiving EU/IMF bailout assistance.  
Entering Friday’s meeting, the leaders had four options on the table, none of 
them pleasant: 
(i) Give Cyprus a complete bailout (estimated to cost €18 
billion). 
(ii) Restructure the outstanding Cypriot bonds, €4.4 billion of 
which are governed by Cypriot law and €3.8 billion by 
English law. 
(iii) Haircut excess deposits in the Cypriot banking system; 
that is, deposits in excess of the €100,000 minimum 
covered by the local deposit insurance scheme.  These 
represent about half of the total deposit base. 
(iv) Haircut the insured deposits. 
The European leaders chose options (iii) and (iv).  Insured 
depositors will suffer a 6.75% loss on their deposits; amounts in excess of 
that level will be subject to a solidarity contribution of 9.9%.  Holders of 
Cypriot sovereign bonds will emerge unscathed.  The next bond maturing on 
June 3, 2013 in the amount of €1.4 billion -- a large chunk of which is reputed 
to have been bought by international hedge funds over the last six months at 
prices ranging from 70-75 cents on the euro -- will be paid out at 100 cents 
on the euro in about ten weeks.  Each depositor in a Cypriot bank, large and 
small, will be making a solidarity contribution toward that payment to 
bondholders. 
                                                
* Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and the Duke Law School, respectively. 
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Friday night’s decisions will send two regrettable, and 
apparently already regretted, messages.  First, that deposit insurance 
schemes may protect you if your bank manager absconds with your money 
but not if your own government takes it.  Second, that, yes indeed, peripheral 
Eurozone sovereign bonds do benefit from an implicit northern European 
guarantee. 
How might it have been different?  Here is a sketch of an 
alternative approach had Friday’s priority between insured depositors and 
bondholders been inverted: 
1. All insured depositors to be protected.  Indeed, the public 
announcement of the bailout package would liberally 
sprinkle adjectives such as “sacred” and “inviolable” in front 
of the words “insured deposits” wherever they appear. 
2. Holders of deposits in excess of the insured €100,000 
minimum would receive, at par, interest-bearing bank 
certificates of deposit for those excess amounts.  Depositors 
would be given the option of taking CDs of, say, five or ten 
years’ duration, with differing interest rates designed to 
encourage a longer stretch out.  Also, to encourage a take-
up of the longer dated CDs, the Government could offer a 
limited recourse guarantee on the ten-year CDs benefiting 
from a pledge of a portion of the Cypriot gas revenues that 
should come on line when those CDs mature.  The CDs 
would be freely tradable and liquid in the hands of the 
holders. 
3. The maturity dates of all sovereign bonds would be 
extended by a fixed number of years, let’s say five years.  
By our reckoning, this would reduce the total amount of the 
required official sector bailout funding during a three-year 
program period by about €6.6 billion. 
The benefits?  Terming out excess deposits will effectively lock 
in that funding to the banks for many years.  The alternative (debiting 9.9 
percent now and watching the balance of 90.1 percent get out of Dodge 
when the banks reopen) may easily require the bailout package to be 
reworked in a month’s time.   
Rescheduling the maturity dates of outstanding sovereign 
bonds -- with no haircut to principal or interest rate -- would avoid the need to 
have those maturities repaid out of official sector bailout funds.  A principal 
extension of this kind is the most clement of the three tools in a sovereign 
debt restructurer’s tool box, the other two are surgeon’s saws labeled, 
respectively, “principal” and “interest”. 
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The objections?   
• “The banks still need to be recapitalized.”  Answer -- true.  
But an institution, one-half of whose funding has been 
locked in at a fixed rate for a decade, is a whole lot easier 
and cheaper to stabilize than one whose funding (or at least 
90.1% of it) is hourly at risk of departure. 
• “The sovereign bonds are not the problem.”  Answer -- 
partially true.  Unshackled from its submerged banking 
sector, the Cypriot sovereign is not in such bad shape.  The 
immediate objective, however, is to bring the aggregate size 
of the bailout package down to a level that will be tolerable 
in the eyes of northern European Parliaments.  Removing 
the bond maturities from the program window should shave 
€6.6 billion from that tab, well above the €2.8 billion that 
Friday’s plan expects to extract from the reluctant pockets of 
retail depositors. 
• “The Cypriot banks own most of the bonds; it will be like 
punching a pillow.”  Answer -- largely irrelevant.  With half of 
their liabilities stretched out for many years, stretching out a 
portion of their assets is less worrisome. 
• “The holdouts in a bond restructuring will eat you alive.”  
Answer -- maybe so, but probably not.  Slight more than half 
of the bonds are under Cypriot law and these can be dealt 
with by a retrofit collection action clause à la grecque.  Each 
of the English law bonds contains its own collective action 
clause.  We have elsewhere speculated on a broader 
measure that the Eurozone could take to discourage 
prospective holdouts.1 
There are no painless or riskless options in Cyprus.  But the 
decisions of Friday night should stand for the proposition that some options 
are incandescently more painful and risky than others. 
* * * * 
                                                
1 See Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem of Holdouts in Eurozone 
Sovereign Debt Restructurings (January 2013) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205704). 
